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Toward a More Lenient Law: Trends in Sentencing from the
European Court of Human Rights
By Nina Kisit* & Sarah King**
In the last few years, a trend has emerged from the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) suggesting
that the Court's motivation behind the sentencing deci-
sions it reviews may be shifting away from solely punitive
measures to focus on fairness, rehabilitation, and release of
incarcerated persons. This pattern has crystallized as the Court
increasingly decides cases based on determinations of whether
or not domestic jurisdictions are upholding their obligations
under international law. Established in 1959, the Court rules
on alleged violations of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR, the Convention),' a document that is binding on
Member States of the Council of Europe (CoE). ECtHR judg-
ments interpret the Convention in individual cases, making the
Court's jurisprudence especially important for CoE Member
States, as judgments provide clarity to the ECHR and ultimately
aim to harmonize criminal (and other) justice systems.2 The
ECtHR has been sitting as a full-time court to which individuals
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can apply directly since 1998,3 and its decisions are binding on
CoE Member States, which have an obligation to execute the
decisions.'
In the more than 10,000 judgments since its inception, the
Court has had the opportunity to consider many aspects of the
fairness and legality of trials and sentencing under the require-
ments of the ECHR.5 While several articles of the ECHR might
potentially have an impact on the ECtHR's interpretation of
issues related to trials and sentencing, this article will primarily
focus on how the Court's more recent interpretation of Articles
3 and 7 indicate a potential shift in its approach to these topics.6
Article 3 of the ECHR concerns the prohibition against
torture, stating that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Article 7 sets
out the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without law), stating that:
(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence
on account of any act or omission which did not consti-
tute a criminal offence under national or international
law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was appli-
cable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
(2) This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punish-
ment of any person for any act or omission which, at
the time when it was committed, was criminal accord-
ing to the general principles of law recognised by
civilised nations.
Both Articles have been used by the Court in recent deci-
sions, discussed below, to direct the approach of national laws
on sentencing of convicted persons.
The ECtHR has stated that, while punishment remains one
of the aims of imprisonment, the emphasis in European penal
policy is now focused on the rehabilitative aim of imprisonment,
particularly as it concerns lengthy prison sentences.9 This posi-
tion is reflected in a string of recent cases decided by the Court.
Beginning in late 2009, the ECtHR entered several judgments,
first in its Sections and then in the Grand Chamber, indicating its
general approach on CoE Member States' sentencing policies.
These judgments are Vinter v. United Kingdom, Damjanovi
and Maktouf v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, M. v. Germany, Del
Rio Prada v. Spain, and Ocalan v. Turkey,10 all of which were
decided within the last year. In each case, the Court considered
a combination of interpretations of Articles 3, 5, 6, and 7 as they
relate to the fairness and legality of sentencing, highlighting the
nuance of what appears to be the ECtHR's evolving view on
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Trhe ECtHR has stated that, while punishment remains one of the aims
of imprisonment th emphasis in E uropea pen al policy is no focused
on the rhabilitat ie aim- of _viprimt particularly as it concerns
lengthypriso senteces
both the purpose and implementation of sentencing of convicted
persons.
This emerging policy has the potential to influence both
the national court systems within CoE Member States and
international tribunals. Since ECtHR jurisprudence has prec-
edential power in all CoE Member States, not just those that are
the subject of particular applications, the above decisions can
affect national law and policy far beyond the country named
in the judgment. In addition to their application in domestic
courts, ECtHR decisions have been shown to have persuasive
authority in international courts and tribunals. For example,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's (ICTR) Trial
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza observed that regional
human rights treaties, such as the European and the American
Conventions on Human Rights, and the jurisprudence developed
thereunder, are persuasive authority which may be of assistance
in applying and interpreting the law applicable to the Tribunal."
Most of these cases (Del Rio Prada, Damjanovib and
Maktouf and M. v. Germany) deal with non-retroactive applica-
tion of criminal law, some of which even consider the specific
types of criminal sanctions. Several important issues can be
derived from the jurisprudence presented in the following text,
including the Court's emerging tendency to encourage potential
rehabilitation of offenders. This article will introduce and ana-
lyze the ECtHR's string of recent decisions related to criminal
sanctions. It will then consider how these decisions are likely to
affect the broader international context, extending beyond the
specific countries involved.
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In order to understand the shift in Court policy, this article
will highlight the Court's four most recent decisions on this
topic: Vinter v. United Kingdom, Maktouf and Damjanovib v.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Del Rio Prada v. Spain, and Ocalan
v. Turkey.12
The first of these four cases decided by the Grand Chamber
of the ECtHR was Vinter v. United Kingdom.13 In Vinter, the
Grand Chamber considered the UK's "Whole Life Order" which
provided convicted persons no possibility of parole or release
irrespective of rehabilitation, good behavior, or other changed
circumstances. The ECtHR found that the "Whole Life Orders"
violated Article 3, not because they were grossly disproportion-
ate, but because of other guiding principles of the Article. 14 It
further found that, in order to be compatible with Article 3, the
mode of punishment must include both "the prospect of release
and a possibility for review."1 5 The Court went on to state that
without the possibility of release or review, the "punishment
becomes greater with time: the longer the prisoner lives, the
longer his sentence." 16
The second of these cases to address sentencing consider-
ations before the ECtHR, Maktouf and Damjanovib v. Bosnia
and Herzegovina, was decided on July 18, 2013 and primar-
ily rested on the question of the retroactive application of law
and compatibility with Article 7 of the ECHR.1 Both of these
consolidated cases dealt with the application of the 2003 BiH
Criminal Code to crimes committed while the 1976 Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
Criminal Code was in effect. The specific
consideration was whether the higher
minimum sentence for war crimes would
amount to an unlawful retroactive appli-
cation of less lenient law to the convicted
persons. The ECtHR found that, in both
Maktouf and Damjanovib, the Court of
BiH acted inappropriately when it retro-
A actively applied law that was detrimental
to the defendants in violation of Article 7
as it related to war crimes cases.
In the second half of 2013, the Court
considered Del Rio Prada v. Spain.
Originally heard in the Third Section of
the Court on July 10, 2012, the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR ruled on this case
on October 21, 2013, finding that Spain
violated Article 7 of the ECHR. The
n Flickr Creative Court considered whether the application
of a new doctrine that had the effect of
2
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extending the convicted person's time incarcerated and that was
adopted after sentencing amounted to an unlawful retroactive
application of law. The ECtHR found that, although the Spanish
Supreme Court did not retroactively apply the law in question
(no. 7/2003), its actions still amounted to a violation of Article
7."1 The ECtHR determined that the Spanish Supreme Court
aimed to accomplish the same outcome as the above-mentioned
law in its actions toward the applicant. It further found that the
applicant could not have foreseen the Spanish Court's actions
because they departed so far from the Court's own case law.
Thus, since these actions were detrimental to the applicant due
to their harmful retroactive application of law to a convicted
person, the Court found a violation of
Article 7.19
Finally, on March 18, 2014, the
ECtHR adopted a judgment in Ocalan
v. Turkey (application nos. 24069/03,
197/04, 6201/06, and 10464/07), in
which it unanimously held that there
had been a violation of Article 3 of the
ECHR due to the life sentence without
possibility of conditional release. The 1ri 1
Court reiterated that the requirements
of Article 3 would be satisfied if
national law affords a possibility of
review of a life sentence with an option of commutation, remis-
sion, termination, or conditional release. In other words, a life
sentence must be "reducible," providing for both a prospect of
release and a possibility of review.
THE EC vx 1
The four decisions above highlight an emerging trend in the
Court's application of the ECHR to broader issues of sentencing
and penal policy as considered within a human rights frame-
work. Looking specifically at the implications of Articles 3 and
7 to cases regarding the rights of convicted persons, the ECtHR
has made it clear that it intends to follow a policy whereby
punishment must not only be fair and proportional to the crime,
but must also be crafted in such a way that penal systems aim to
also rehabilitate.
In order to make this point clear, the Court has used relevant
articles in the Convention to re-emphasize, and perhaps broaden,
the well-known principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine
lege, stressing that any punishment must be crafted to incentiv-
ize socially desirable behavior. In other words, any punishment
that is applied to an accused retroactively without requisite
notice serves only to punish. Those punishments do not serve to
incentivize the actor's movement away from criminal behavior.
Additionally, it is clear that the ECtHR considers any punish-
ment that does not provide convicted persons with the prospect
of rejoining society after demonstrating the desired behavior to
be not only inappropriately cruel and unusual, but also represen-
tative of a failure of society to give the convicted person motive
to reform. Through the four recent Court decisions detailed
above, the Court is moving toward a model that favors not sim-
ply punishment but also incentivizing desired behavior.
The ECtHR found that the requirements of Article 3 were
not met in relation to any of the three applicants in Vinter v.
United Kingdom, concluding that "there is ... clear support in
European and international law for
the principle that all prisoners, includ-
ing those serving life sentences, be
offered the possibility of rehabilitation
and the prospect of release if that reha-
bilitation is achieved."2 1 Thus, when
addressing a life sentence, Article 3
must be interpreted as requiring the
potential for reducibility of the sen-
tence. There must be a review that
"allows the domestic authorities to
consider whether any changes in the
life [and behavior of the] prisoner are
so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been
made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued
detention could no longer be justified on legitimate penological
grounds."22
The ECtHR set forth a clear pronouncement in Vinter that, in
order to meet its obligations under the ECHR, a state's domestic
sentencing guidelines must ensure that progress toward reha-
bilitation is always a possibility for convicted persons. This
requirement demonstrates that the Court does not view sentenc-
ing merely in the penological context, but that it will review
guidelines to ensure that sentencing also serves the purposes of
encouraging progress toward the behavior that meets society's
expectations of its citizens. Based on this analysis, mere punish-
ment does not appear to meet the guidelines prescribed under
the Convention.
ARTICLE 7
Article 7 of the ECHR pronounces the principle of nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege, meaning that there shall be no
punishment without law. It also makes clear that no "heavier
penalty [shall] be imposed than the one that was applicable at
the time the criminal offen[s]e was committed."23
On December 17, 2009, the Court ruled in M. v. Germany
that "the concept of 'penalty' in Article 7 is autonomous in scope
and it is thus for the Court to determine whether a particular
measure should be qualified as a penalty, without being bound
by the qualification of the measure under domestic law."24 The
Court went on to state that in order to "render the protection
afforded by Article 7 effective the Court must remain free to
go behind appearances and assess for itself whether a particular
measure amounts in substance to a 'penalty' within the mean-
ing of this provision."25 In other words, the Court must have the
1
ARTICLE 3
Article 3 provides an absolute prohibition on torture, provid-
ing that, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."2 0 The Court has analyzed
its sentencing principles in light of Article 3 to determine if the
challenged sentences violate the categorical pronouncement
contained therein. When conducting its analysis, the Court con-
sidered whether or not sentences that specifically prohibit the
possibility for release are illegal under Article 3.
3
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flexibility to look at both the action and the result of the action
proposed.
The wording of Article 7 paragraph I indicates, in relevant
part, that determination of the presence of a penalty must
begin with an assessment of whether the measure in question
is imposed following conviction for a criminal offense. "Other
relevant factors are the characterization of the measure under
domestic law, its nature and purpose, the procedures involved in
its making and implementation, and its severity."26 When con-
sidering the Court's treatment of Article 7, the ECtHR does not
necessarily confine its application "to prohibiting the retroactive
application of the criminal law to an accused's disadvantage."2
"It also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law
can define a crime and prescribe a penalty,"2 8 as well as "the
principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed
to an accused's detriment."29
The Court notes in this connection that the same type of
measure may be, and has been, qualified as a penalty in one
state and as a preventive measure to which the principle of
nulla poena sine lege does not apply in another. Thus, placing
recidivists and habitual offenders at the government's disposal in
Belgium, for instance, which is in many ways similar to preven-
tive detention under German law, has been considered a penalty
under Belgian law.30 However, the Court concluded that, looking
behind appearances and making its own assessment, preven-
tive detention under the German
Criminal Code qualifies as a
"penalty" for the purposes of [A/
Article 7 Section 1, and, as a
result, Germany violated this
Section of the Convention.
ad a
As mentioned above, the ECtHR found that it would have
been difficult, if not impossible, for the applicant to foresee the
Supreme Court's departure from precedent. Thus, it was also
impossible for the applicant to know at the material time, and
also at the time when all the sentences were combined into one,
that the Audiencia Nacional34 would calculate the reductions
of sentence in respect to each sentence individually and not the
total term to be served, thereby substantially lengthening the
time she would actually serve. Consequently, the ECtHR found
that it was required to reject the government's preliminary objec-
tion and the application of the "Parot doctrine,"35 thus conclud-
ing that there was a violation of Article 7 of the Convention.36
This particular case demonstrates a situation where the Court
found it necessary to emphasize that the applicant could not pos-
sibly have foreseen the Spanish government's interpretation of
her sentence and remission of that sentence for behavior while
incarcerated. The inability to foresee this action removes any
incentive the accused might have otherwise had for progressive,
desired behavior.
In
111
c
In Damjanovit and Maktouf
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
ECtHR reviewed the scope of
Article 7. In considering the retroactive application of a law
where the minimum sentence was harsher than the original
minimum sentence, the Court found that BiH violated Article 7
Section 1 of the ECHR. The ECtHR concluded that the Court of
BiH should have applied provisions of the 1976 SFRY Criminal
Code, which could have resulted in more lenient sentences for
the applicants.31
Similarly, in the case of Del Rio Prada v. Spain (first instance
at ECtHR, affirmed in pertinent part by the Grand Chamber),
the Court noted that the applicant's convictions and the different
prison sentences she was given had a legal basis in the criminal
law applicable at the material time rather than at the time of
conviction.3 The ECtHR also noted that the Spanish Supreme
Court's new interpretation of a law, as applied in that case, led
to the applicant's sentence, which was retroactively extended
by almost nine years. This extension was due to the fact that,
up to that date, Spanish law had allowed work completed while
incarcerated to count toward a remission of the sentence. Under
the new Supreme Court interpretation of Spanish law, all of the
remissions to which the accused would have been entitled were
lost because of the length of the original sentences pronounced
against her.33
ERPN
The ECtHR is not the only non-domestic court where
this trend is observed. When the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) decided Berlusconi and Others, it prominently held that
the principle of the retroactive
application of the more lenient
penalty formed part of the con-
stitutional traditions common to
the EU Member States.3 Where
the law in question was found to
S f r v be retroactively applied, the ECJ
stated that "[a] consequence of
that kind would be contrary to
the limits which flow from the
essential nature of any directive, which . . . preclude[s] a direc-
tive from having the effect of determining or increasing the
liability in criminal law of accused persons."3 8
If this trend is to ultimately have real impact, it must be felt at
the domestic level where the vast majority of decisions are made.
The following decisions demonstrate national courts falling in
line with ECtHR jurisprudence related to retroactive application
of sentencing. Both Norway and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
are members of the CoE, and as discussed above, BiH was the
direct recipient of an ECtHR decision on this point.
NORWAY
One example of domestic courts adopting the same reason-
ing exhibited by the ECtHR, albeit before the aforementioned
decisions were announced, was the domestic trial court in
Norway v. Breivik. In this case, the defendant detonated a car
bomb in the Government District in Oslo killing eight people
and injuring nine others. He later killed sixty-nine people and
injured thirty-three in a shooting rampage at Utoya Island, most
of whom were youths attending a summer camp.3 9
In light of the nature of the crimes, the defendant received a
punishment that has been widely discussed as being too lenient.
However, in determining the sentence, the court in Norway made
12
c
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it clear that it was required to follow the
penal code as it was written at the time
of the crime. In Breivik, the Court found
that there was no doubt that the acts were
done with premeditation and under espe-
cially aggravating circumstances.4 0 The
defendant was sentenced to preventive
detention for a term of twenty-one years,
the maximum sentence allowed under
the Norwegian penal code, despite inter-
national criticism of the punishment's
perceived leniency.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
On October 22, 2013, the Constitu-
tional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina
adopted a number of decisions on appeals
filed against verdicts from the Court European Court ofHi
of BiH.4 1 These appeals stemmed from Commons
cases in which the appellants were sen-
tenced to prison for war crimes, which are identically proscribed
in the 1976 SFRY Criminal Code and the 2003 BiH Criminal
Code as war crimes against civilians and genocide.42
In these specific cases, the Constitutional Court consistently
applied the standards set forth in the ECtHR's judgment of
Damjanovib and Maktouf v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.4 3 As dis-
cussed above, that decision addressed the application of Article
7 of the ECHR, which prohibits the retroactive application of the
law without exception and imposes the obligation to apply the
more lenient criminal law in any case, regardless of the nature
and gravity of the offense.44
In all of these decisions, the Constitutional Court found that
the verdicts of the Court of BiH violated the appellant's rights
arising from Article 7 Section 1 of the ECHR because there was
a real possibility that the retroactive application of the 2003 BiH
Criminal Code operated to their detriment in terms of sentenc-
ing. Consequently, the Constitutional Court overturned the judg-
ments of the Appeals Chamber of the Court of BiH. It found in
all cases that the Court of BiH violated the stated constitutional
rights of the appellants and remanded the cases to the lower
court to adopt new decisions in accordance with Article 7 of the
Convention. 45
The crux of the Constitutional Court's decisions was the fact
that the SFRY Criminal Code was more lenient with respect
to the maximum possible sentence imposed in these cases.
Although the Criminal Code of SFRY prescribed sentences of
uman Rights (Strasbourg) -photo courtesy of CherryX on Wikimedia
five to fifteen years and the death penalty that could be miti-
gated to twenty years imprisonment for war crimes, it is notable
that the death penalty was an available punishment under the
SFRY Criminal Code, whereas it was not available under sub-
sequent laws.46 Because BiH signed Protocol 6 to the ECHR in
200247 and Protocol 13 to the ECHR in 2003,48 the death penalty
could not be imposed in subsequent cases, making the maximum
possible penalty under SFRY harsher than the maximum pos-
sible penalty under the codes of BiH.
While these cases represent just the beginning, they do dem-
onstrate the initial trickle down of the trends from the ECtHR
into the practice of the national courts. It will be important to
watch for developments in this field as the ECtHR shows no
signs of reversing the trend in its decision-making, and all CoE
Member States will be held to its standard.
The above analysis demonstrates what appears to be an
emerging trend within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In its
pattern of emphasizing the importance of rehabilitation of
offenders and societies while routinely applying the more lenient
law, the ECtHR has repeatedly rejected the arguments from
several governments that the gravity of the crime should be the
primary determining factor in the punishment. This approach,
seen not only at the ECtHR, but also in domestic courts and
tribunals, should signal to practitioners the need to carefully
analyze these considerations in the application for and defense
of criminal sentences.
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